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Recently, Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels have offered a new argument 
against the transitivity of the relationship ‘all things considered better 
than’.’ This argument, in its various guises, invokes our intuitions about 
our preferences over different bundles of pleasurable or painful experi- 
ences with different durations] which, it is argued, will typically be in- 
transitive. This article defends against this argument the orthodox view 
that the relation ‘all things considered better than’ should be regarded 
as transitive by showing that Temkin and Rachels are mistaken in sup- 
posing that a preference relation satisfymg their assumptions must be 
intransitive. It makes clear where the argument goes wrong by showing 
that it is a version of Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. 
Their argument centers around two kinds of counterexamples to the 
transitivity of ‘all things considered better than’, one involving painful 
and the other involving pleasurable experiences of differing duration. 
Since Temkin and Rachels both offer an example of painful experiences, 
we begin by discussing this case in Section I. Section I1 explains why the 
argument fails. Section I11 explains why the case of pleasure is of the 
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same form, and can be solved in the same way. Section IV contains some 
general remarks on counterexamples to the transitivity of ‘all things con- 
sidered better than’. 
I. THEARGUMENT 
Temkin and Rachels’s pain counterexample rests on the following three 
claims, which they hold to be true:2 
Claim I :  For any unpleasant or ‘negative’ experience, no matter what 
the intensity and duration of that experience, it would be better to 
have that experience than one that was only a little less intense but 
that lasted much 10nger.~ 
Claim x There is a finely distinguishable range of unpleasant or ‘nega- 
tive’ experiences ranging in intensity from mild discomfort to ex- 
treme agony. 
Claim 3: No matter how long it must be endured, mild discomfort is 
preferable to extreme agony for a significant amount of time. 
Ternkin and Rachels believe that these claims taken together contra- 
dict the transitivity of ‘all things considered better than’. They invite us to 
imagine first a lengthy life that contains an amount of excruciating tor- 
ture of significant but relatively short duration. Let us call this combina- 
tion of torture and the time it must be endured To. It follows from the first 
claim that one would prefer a life containing To to an otherwise identical 
life that contains TI ,  where TI represents slightly less intense torture for 
a much longer period of time. Claim 2 then allows us to apply the first 
claim repeatedly with a slightly lower intensity of torture and a longer 
time period to generate a chain of preferences, which Temkin and 
Rachels argue runs from To (excruciating torture for a short period of 
time) at one end to T,,,, (a mild pain for a very long time) at the other. 
Temkin envisages the mild pain as a hangnail, Rachels as a slight 
headache. Each member of this chain is preferred to its successor. By 
transitivity, To is preferred to TMILD, But by claim 3, T,, is preferred to 
To, so that claims i ,2 ,  and 3 generate an intransitive preference. 
2. Rachels, “Counterexamples,” pp. 72-75 and pp. 78-79 and Ternkin, “Continuum,” p. 179. 
3. Rachels, “Counterexamples,” p. 73, mentions 100 times as long, while Temkin men- 
tions twice as long. Nothing depends on this number. 
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Temkin and Rachels deduce far-reaching conclusions from their pur- 
ported demonstration that it may be reasonable for people to have in- 
transitive preferences. Rachels advocates abandoning what he calls 
“maximizing theories” for evaluating the goodness of states of affairs in 
favor of his own “quasi-maximizing theory” that embraces intransitivity.* 
Temkin quotes Derek Parfit to the effect that the argument leads to a 
“general skepticism about practical reasoning,” and concludes that 
“whatever we say, in the end, about my arguments, they may require us 
to seriously rethink our understanding of the good, moral ideals and the 
nature of practical reasoning.”5 We believe no such drastic measures are 
required, since, as we show in the next section, claims i , 2 ,  and 3 are con- 
sistent with transitivity. 
11. WHY THE ARGUMENT FAILS 
One case of a person of whom claims i ,2, and 3 are true, but who holds 
transitive preferences, suffices to show that the argument is wrong. A 
person who maximizes a utility function has transitive preferences. But 
a person who maximizes the utility function 
where u is utility, p z o is the intensity of pain, and t 2 o the length of 
time it must be endured, satisfies the three claims. Such Cobb-Douglas 
utility functions are standard in economics when representing trade- 
offs between different commodities. The only differences are the nega- 
tive sign (because the commodities are bads rather than goods) and the 
denominator, which represents the fact that for this person, an extra 
hour of pain is less troublesome after many days of pain than after a few 
hours of pain. 
A person with utility function u satisfies claim 1, since for every level of 
pain, if we slightly decrease the intensity of pain and significantly in- 
crease the duration he must bear it, he will prefer the bundle with the 
slightly greater amount of pain. For example, suppose the level of pain 
4. Rachels, % Set of Solutions to Parfit’s Problems.” 
5. Temkin, “Continuum,” pp. 209-10. 
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for excruciating torture equals 10 and the duration the torture must be 
endured is 2. For a person with utility function u the disutility of this 
(pain, duration) bundle is 6.7. Unpleasant as it is for him, this person will 
still prefer this bundle to a (pain, duration) bundle of (9,4), the disutility 
of which is 7.2. Utility function u is also compatible with claim 2, since it 
allows for a continuum of levels of pain. Finally, for a person with a util- 
ity function like u, claim 3 holds as well: a mild pain, no matter how long 
endured, will simply never generate the disutility of the pain of a signifi- 
cant amount of extreme torture. For suppose that the level of pain of a 
hangnail equals 1, and consider again subjecting our protagonist to ex- 
cruciating torture of level 10 for duration 2. As we saw, the disutility of 
this amount of torture for someone with u is 6.7. Now, no matter how 
large we make t, the disutility of a hangnail can never exceed i.‘j For this 
person, as for the “competent judges” invoked by Stuart Rachels and the 
audiences polled by Larry Temkin, there is a fundamental gap between 
the badness of being tortured for a significant amount of time and the 
badness of enduring a hangnail. As Temkin writes: 
When I imagine having a hangnail for a very long time, it is not as if I 
imagine my situation getting closer and closer to being as bad as get- 
ting tortured for two years, but at such a slow rate that my imagina- 
tion gives out long before I ever reach such a point. Rather, I imagine 
that there is a fundamental gap between the pain of being tortured for 
two years and the pain of the hangnail, and that gap is no closer to being 
bridged after 1000 years than it was after 100, or 50, or 1 0 . ~  
Rachels and Temkin go wrong when they suppose that the chain 
of preferences To > TI > . . . > T, over bundles of intensity of pain 
and its duration that is generated by the repeated application of claims 
1 and 2 will necessarily reach a bundle TMILD, where the level of pain 
is equal to that of a hangnail or a slight headache. For a person with a 
6.  Note how our proposed utility function matches with Temkin, “Continuum,” p. 192: 
“My model for this is something like the following. Torture’s badness might range from o to 
10, depending on its duration, with two years of torture being, say, a 7. A hangnail’s bad- 
ness might range from o to 1. Prolonging a hangnail increases the value of the decimal 
places representing its ‘badness score’, but the fundamental gap between 1 and 7 is never 
affected.” 
7. Temkin, “Continuum,” pp. 19i-ga. 
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utility function like u, the levels of pain in the chain To > TI > - > T, 
will converge to some limit larger than the mild pain of a hangnail or a 
slight headache. 
It may be illuminating to note that this argument is a version of Zeno’s 
paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. To recall, Zen0 argued that if given a 
head start at the time to when the race starts, the tortoise can never be 
caught by Achilles, even though Achilles is faster, since at the moment tl 
when Achilles is where the tortoise was when Achilles started, the tor- 
toise will have moved on. When Achilles reaches the tortoise’s new posi- 
tion at time t2, the tortoise will have moved on again. Continuing this 
way, we construct an infinite sequence tl - to, &- tl, . . . of the successive 
time intervals it takes Achilles to get to where the tortoise was when 
Achilles started each leg of his attempt to catch the tortoise. Zen0 ar- 
gued that the terms of this infinite sequence must sum to infinity, and 
hence the tortoise is never overtaken, but they actually sum to a finite 
number. 
Figure 1 explains why the argument criticized in this article is a version 
of Zeno’s paradox. The points To and TMILD are, respectively “two years of 
extreme pain” and “a very long time with a hangnail or a slight head- 
ache.” With the utility function u, a person will be indifferent between all 
combinations of pain and duration that lie on a curve such as that 
drawn through To. The arrows show the direction of his preferences: he 
will prefer all points to the left of an indifference curve to any point on 
the curve, and he will prefer any point on the curve to all points that lie 
to the right of this curve. Note that each indifference curve has a vertical 
asymptote. The bold indifference curve drawn through To has a vertical 
asymptote at the pain level u. As we decrease the pain intensity while re- 
maining on the indifference curve (thereby remaining at the same utility 
level) the duration of the pain increases to infinity, but the pain intensity 
never falls below u. 
The points To, T,, T2, and T3 show the first elements of the chain 
Temkin and Rachels must construct for their argument. Like the sum of 
the successive time intervals in the story of Achilles and the tortoise in 
Zeno’s paradox, the sequence po, pl, p 2 , .  . . converges to some limit t .  
Since 4 2 a > h I L D ,  p n  can never reach hILD. The attempt to construct 
a chain of preferences starting with To and ending with TMIm therefore 
fails, no matter how much time we associate with TMILD. 
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Indifference Curves in the Space of (Pain, Duration) Bundles 
111. THE CASE OF PLEASURE 
In several articles, Rachels offers an analogous counterexample to tran- 
sitivity based on an analysis of a series of pleasurable experiences of dif- 
fering intensity and duration.* He posits the following claims: 
Claim 15 For any experience of pleasure, no matter what the intensity 
and duration of that pleasure, it is better to experience a slightly less 
intense pleasure that lasts 100 times as long3 
8. Rachels, “Counterexamples,” pp. 75-78, ‘X Set of Solutions,” pp. 2E-16, and “Intransitivity.” 
9. In “A Set of Solutions,” Rachels calls this the “principle of duration.” 
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Claim 2: There is a finely distinguishable range of pleasurable or 
‘positive’ experiences ranging in intensity from ecstasy to mild pleasure. 
Claim 3*: No finite duration, no matter how long, of mild pleasure is 
as good as any significant duration of ecstasy, no matter how short.l0 
Rachels then invites us to imagine first an experience of ecstasy of sig- 
nificant duration. Let us call this bundle of ecstasy and time it is experi- 
enced E,,. It follows from claim i* that one would prefer a bundle El, 
where El represents slightly less pleasure lasting 100 times as long, to E,. 
Claim 2* then allows us to apply the first claim repeatedly with a slightly 
lower intensity of pleasure and a longer time period to generate a chain 
of preferences, which Rachels argues runs from E, (ecstasy for a short, 
but significant period of time) at one end to EMILD (mild pleasure for an 
extremely long time) at the other. Each subsequent member of this 
chain is preferred to its predecessor. By transitivity, is preferred to 
E,. But by claim 3*, E, is preferred to EMILD, so that claims I*, 2*, and 3* 
generate an intransitive preference. 
Whether or not these claims are plausible, this counterexample fails 
once again because we can construct a utility function for a person of 
whom claims I*, 2*, and 3* are true. A person who maximizes the utility 
function 
where u is utility, e 2 o is the intensity of pleasure, and t 2 o the length of 
time it is enjoyed, satisfies the three claims. This is the same utility func- 
tion as before but without the negative sign, because the commodities 
are now goods. As before, the denominator entails that an extra hour of 
bliss is less wonderful after many days of bliss than after a few minutes. 
For a person with this utility function, a night of ecstasy is worth more 
than a lifetime of bourgeois comfort. Indeed, it might be said to represent 
well the feelings of Dostoevsky, whom Rachels approvingly quotes. 
“In certain moments, I experience a joy that is unthinkable under ordi- 
nary circumstances, and of which most people have no comprehension. 
Then I feel that I am in complete harmony with myself and the whole 
world, and this feeling is so bright and strong that you could give up 
10. In “A Set of Solutions,” Rachels calls this the “principle of lexicality.” 
279 Defending Transitivity against 
Zeno’s Paradox 
ten years for a few seconds of that ecstasy-yes, even your whole 
life.”” 
We may conclude, contra Rachels, that should Dostoevsky also have 
held claim i* to be true, we would nevertheless have no reason to pre- 
sume his preferences were intransitive. 
Iv A REMARK ON COUNTEREXAMPLES TO TRANSITIVITY 
Temkin’s and Rachels’s arguments fail. But suppose that with a different 
example we could all be persuaded that our choices in a pairwise com- 
parison of three alternatives A, B, and C express a genuinely intransitive 
preference relation: A > B > C > A. An economist would then say that 
this determines how we would choose from each of the feasible sets 
{A, B} ,  {B, C } ,  and {C, A}. He would also say, however, that we have failed 
to consider everything that matters because we do not specify how we 
would choose from the full set {A, B, C}. Whatever we plan to choose 
from this set, say A, we are in trouble if someone now removes C from 
(A, B, C }  on the grounds that its presence is irrelevant because it is not 
going to be chosen and because our valuation of the options A and B is 
independent of its presence or absence. When Cis gone, we are left with 
{A, B } ,  from which we are committed to choose B. We believe that a no- 
tion of rational choice that allows such violations of the Independence 
of Irrelevant Alternatives would lack any useful content.12 
11. Rachels, “Counterexamples,” p. 77. 
IZ. The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives was introduced by John Nash in “The 
Bargaining Problem,” Econornetricu 18 (1950): 155-62. It differs from Kenneth Arrow’s well- 
known condition of the same name that relates individual and social preferences. Amartya 
Sen, in “Internal Consistency of Choice,” Econometricu 61 (1993): 495-521, expresses regret 
at the fact that Nash’s and Arrow’s conditions are often confused and renames Nash’s con- 
dition “basic contraction consistency.” If a choice function C specifies for any admissible 
nonempty set S of alternatives a nonempty subset C(S) called the choice set of S, then Sen 
formulates the condition as 
(x E C(S) and x E Q c S) implies x E C( Q) . 
For the condition to make sense, the alternatives must be formulated in a manner that 
makes it possible to eliminate alternatives from a feasible set without altering our relative 
valuation of the alternatives that remain. Sen describes cases where this property appears 
to be violated by a rational chooser, but all his examples involve cases where the removal 
of one of the unchosen options changes the (expected) worth of the remaining alterna- 
tives. This means that the removed options are not irrelevant to the remaining alternatives. 
